dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data), is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl). get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0 Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140 ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40 allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31) A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation. Clamp data_start to the buffer size. Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can only be triggered by root.

Where it's fixed