CVE-2026-98283

KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: fix use-after-free in kvmhv_emulate_tlbie_all_lpid()

CVE-2026-98283 is fixed in 2 products on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98283, released October 6, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Urgent.

Urgent
CVSS
9.8
Critical
Exploitation
None reported
No vendor assessment
CISA KEV
Not listed
Not in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
EPSS
0.0013
2nd percentile

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: fix use-after-free in kvmhv_emulate_tlbie_all_lpid() kvmhv_emulate_tlbie_all_lpid() iterates the nested-guest IDR and drops mmu_lock before calling kvmhv_emulate_tlbie_lpid(), but does not hold a reference on the kvm_nested_guest pointer obtained from the IDR. A concurrent vCPU issuing a single-LPID tlbie (is=2, ric=2) can race through kvmhv_flush_nested() -> kvmhv_remove_nested() -> idr_remove / --refcnt -> kvmhv_release_nested() -> kfree(gp) in that window, leaving the iterating vCPU with a dangling pointer. The subsequent mutex_lock(&gp->tlb_lock) and accesses to gp->shadow_pgtable, gp->shadow_lpid and gp->l1_host all touch freed memory. The free path is fully L1-controlled. Fix this by incrementing gp->refcnt inside the loop before dropping mmu_lock, mirroring what kvmhv_get_nested() does, and releasing the reference with kvmhv_put_nested() after the per-guest work completes. This is the same get/put discipline already used at every other call site that drops mmu_lock while holding a nested-guest pointer.

Where it's fixed

ProductFixed inFixReleased
Linux
linux · Debian 12.15 (bookworm) 6.1.190-1 DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98283 Oct 6, 2026
linux · Debian 13.5 (trixie) 6.12.113-1 DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98283 Oct 6, 2026
linux · Debian 14 7.2.8-1 DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98283 Oct 6, 2026
linux-6.12 · Debian 12.15 (bookworm) 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98283 Oct 6, 2026

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