linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handl...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler A node receiving a DLM_MIG_LOCKRES message trusts several fields of the peer-supplied dlm_migratable_lockres without validation. num_locks and lockname_len are bounded only on the sending side, and the message is never checked to actually carry num_locks migratable_lock entries. As a result dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[0..num_locks) past the kmalloc(data_len) copy of the message (an out-of-bounds read that ends in a BUG_ON panic), and dlm_init_lockres() copies lockname_len bytes into the fixed 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object (a heap out-of-bounds write). Both are reachable by any node in the domain. Validate these fields right after dlm_grab(), before anything uses them -- including the not-joined error path, which already prints mres->lockname with the unbounded lockname_len as a %.*s precision. Reject the message unless lockname_len <= DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX, num_locks <= DLM_MAX_MIGRATABLE_LOCKS (the bound the sender already asserts), and the payload is large enough to hold the claimed locks. Conforming recovery and migration messages are unaffected.

Where it's fixed