linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptf...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags() When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via __skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags. If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic. All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce, skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after __skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

Where it's fixed