linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn()...
CVE-2026-46025 is fixed in 19 products on 1 platform, first by ALAS2023-2026-1754, released May 25, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit race". damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they race with kdamond terminations. Fix those. This patch (of 2); When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request. The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call() requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request. After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together. Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel, the request memory would be leaked. The issue is found by sashiko [1].
Where it's fixed
| Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | |||
| bpftool6.18 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| bpftool6.18-debuginfo · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel-livepatch-6.18.30-61.116 · amzn 2023 | 1:1.0-0.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-debuginfo · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-debuginfo-common-aarch64 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-debuginfo-common-x86_64 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-devel · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-headers · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-modules-extra · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-modules-extra-common · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-tools · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-tools-debuginfo · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| kernel6.18-tools-devel · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| linux · Debian 14 | 7.0.4-1 | DEBIAN-CVE-2026-46025 | May 27, 2026 |
| perf6.18 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| perf6.18-debuginfo · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| python3-perf6.18 · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
| python3-perf6.18-debuginfo · amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.30-61.116.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2026-1754 | May 25, 2026 |
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