linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read i...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_ecred_conn_req Syzbot reported a KASAN stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_build_cmd() that is triggered by a malformed Enhanced Credit Based Connection Request. The vulnerability stems from l2cap_ecred_conn_req(). The function allocates a local stack buffer (`pdu`) designed to hold a maximum of 5 Source Channel IDs (SCIDs), totaling 18 bytes. When an attacker sends a request with more than 5 SCIDs, the function calculates `rsp_len` based on this unvalidated `cmd_len` before checking if the number of SCIDs exceeds L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID. If the SCID count is too high, the function correctly jumps to the `response` label to reject the packet, but `rsp_len` retains the attacker's oversized value. Consequently, l2cap_send_cmd() is instructed to read past the end of the 18-byte `pdu` buffer, triggering a KASAN panic. Fix this by moving the assignment of `rsp_len` to after the `num_scid` boundary check. If the packet is rejected, `rsp_len` will safely remain 0, and the error response will only read the 8-byte base header from the stack.

Where it's fixed