linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Use elf_getshdrnum() instead of e_shnum...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Use elf_getshdrnum() instead of e_shnum This commit replace e_shnum with the elf_getshdrnum() helper to fix two oss-fuzz-reported heap-buffer overflow in __bpf_object__open. Both reports are incorrectly marked as fixed and while still being reproducible in the latest libbpf. # clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-bpf-object-fuzzer-5747922482888704 libbpf: loading object 'fuzz-object' from buffer libbpf: sec_cnt is 0 libbpf: elf: section(1) .data, size 0, link 538976288, flags 2020202020202020, type=2 libbpf: elf: section(2) .data, size 32, link 538976288, flags 202020202020ff20, type=1 ================================================================= ==13==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020000000c0 at pc 0x0000005a7b46 bp 0x7ffd12214af0 sp 0x7ffd12214ae8 WRITE of size 4 at 0x6020000000c0 thread T0 SCARINESS: 46 (4-byte-write-heap-buffer-overflow-far-from-bounds) #0 0x5a7b45 in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3414:24 #1 0x5733c0 in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7223:16 #2 0x5739fd in bpf_object__open_mem /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7263:20 ... The issue lie in libbpf's direct use of e_shnum field in ELF header as the section header count. Where as libelf implemented an extra logic that, when e_shnum == 0 && e_shoff != 0, will use sh_size member of the initial section header as the real section header count (part of ELF spec to accommodate situation where section header counter is larger than SHN_LORESERVE). The above inconsistency lead to libbpf writing into a zero-entry calloc area. So intead of using e_shnum directly, use the elf_getshdrnum() helper provided by libelf to retrieve the section header counter into sec_cnt.

Where it's fixed