# CVE-2026-99178: x86/kvm: Don't consume async #PF flags on a kernel #PF in NMI context

CVE-2026-99178 is fixed in linux on 1 platform by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99178 (version 6.12.115-2), released November 3, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-99178
- Priority: Routine
- CVSS: 6.5 (Moderate)
- EPSS: 0.0017
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Oct 28, 2026
- Vendor advisory: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-99178

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  x86/kvm: Don't consume async #PF flags on a kernel #PF in NMI context  An async #PF "page not present" event arrives through the #PF vector, and its reason sits in the per-CPU apf_reason.flags until __kvm_handle_async_pf() reads and clears it. If an NMI arrives after the event is injected and before the #PF handler reads the flags, and the NMI handler itself takes a #PF, that fault reads and clears the flags belonging to the #PF it interrupted. It then finds interrupts disabled in the NMI context it interrupted, and panics:    Kernel panic - not syncing: Host injected async #PF in interrupt disabled region   Call Trace:    <NMI>    panic+0x52/0x60    __kvm_handle_async_pf+0xb0/0xb0    exc_page_fault+0x71/0xb0    asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30   RIP: 0010:__get_user_nocheck_8+0x6/0x20    perf_callchain_user+0x147/0x1a0    get_perf_callchain+0x12d/0x1c0    ...    perf_event_nmi_handler+0x26/0x50    exc_nmi+0xe8/0x110   RIP: 0010:asm_exc_page_fault+0x0/0x30    </NMI>  The last RIP line shows the NMI landing on the first instruction of the #PF entry. perf with user call chains takes such a fault: the sampling NMI walks the user stack with __get_user(), which faults when a saved frame pointer is not a valid user address or the walk runs off the top of the stack. The same window exists when KVM, running as an L1 hypervisor with DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT, reads the flags itself after a #PF VM-exit.  The NMI entry code saves and restores CR2 for this nesting, but not the async #PF reason. Andy Lutomirski described the race, with perf as the example, when async #PF delivery was reworked in 2020 [1]. Saving and clearing the flags across the NMI, next to CR2, was discussed there but not merged.  Since that rework, Linux has stopped setting KVM_ASYNC_PF_SEND_ALWAYS, so the host delivers "page not present" only for user mode faults and a kernel-mode fault in NMI context (including kernel-mode #MC and #DB) cannot be an async page fault.  In that case, return without touching the flags so that the interrupted handler finds them intact.  Tested on v7.3-rc5 in a 4-vCPU, 2 GiB guest restored from a snapshot whose memory is served on demand through userfaultfd, so that reading it back takes async #PFs, while every thread samples hardware cycles with user call chains and points its frame pointer at an unmapped page. Without this patch the guest panicked as above in 3 of 3 runs. With it, the guest survived 3 of 3 runs of 60 seconds, and the host counted 148,441 to 153,334 kvm_async_pf_not_present events in the first 20 seconds of each. On 6.18.50 the results were the same: the guest panicked without the patch and survived with it.

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | linux Debian 13.5 (trixie) | 6.12.115-2 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99178](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-99178.md) | Nov 3, 2026 |

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Data as of 2026-11-07T18:46:35Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

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