# CVE-2026-99012: Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls

CVE-2026-99012 is fixed in 11 products on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99012, released October 24, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: High.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-99012
- Priority: High
- CVSS: 7.8 (Important)
- EPSS: 0.0016
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Oct 23, 2026
- Vendor advisory: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-99012

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls  iso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock and drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can both pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound.  Caller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can replace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A then uses B's destination with the route selected for its own request. B can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT. For deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaving the first connection's reference and conn->sk back-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the socket's connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection, so a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and access a freed socket.  KASAN reported:    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0   Call Trace:    iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0    iso_conn_del+0x7b/0x1d0    iso_connect_cfm+0x186/0x16a0    hci_conn_failed+0x154/0x280    hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3dc/0x7d0    hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300    Allocated by task 121:    sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0    bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370    iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300    iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100    Freed by task 121:    kfree+0x121/0x3c0    __sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540    iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340    __sock_release+0xa1/0x260  Check admission under the socket lock and mark the connect operation in progress before publishing its destination. Keep that flag set across route lookup and connection setup, rejecting another connect with -EBADFD before it can change the destination or attach a connection. Clear the flag after either helper returns, including on failure, so a failed setup can be retried.  A separate flag is needed because the socket lock must be released before acquiring the HCI device lock, while BT_CONNECT requires an attached connection. Keep the existing state transitions and the deferred CIS completion through iso_sock_recvmsg().  Reject an existing socket attachment in __iso_chan_add() before taking a new reference or publishing either pointer, so every caller preserves the connection association. Keep the same-socket, same-connection success case for deferred CIS setup. Reject an attached socket before BIS setup so a reusable BIS is not claimed before the attachment is rejected.  In CIS setup, reject a different HCI connection before iso_conn_add() and drop the per-attempt HCI hold directly. An unowned iso_conn may still carry another reference after detachment, so its destruction cannot be relied on to release that hold.  iso_listen_bis() creates a fresh PA HCI/ISO pair under the device lock, so the temporary iso_conn_put() frees the ISO candidate and drops its HCI hold on rejection. iso_conn_ready() uses a freshly allocated, unpublished child with no connection, making the socket-side rejection unreachable.

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | kernel-64kb sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-azure sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-default sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-default-base sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1.150700.17.51.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-docs sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-livepatch-SLE15-SP7_Update_24 sles 15.7 | 1-150700.15.3.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-obs-build sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-source sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-syms sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-zfcpdump sles 15.7 | 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-5091-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | linux Debian 13.5 (trixie) | 6.12.113-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99012](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-99012.md) | Oct 24, 2026 |
| Linux | linux Debian 14 | 7.2.11-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99012](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-99012.md) | Oct 24, 2026 |

---

Data as of 2026-11-08T06:59:42Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

Free to use with attribution: show "Data: Patchblox Patch Radar" with a link to https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar. Terms, including what needs a written agreement: https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar/use-the-data

Product names, logos and trademarks shown on Patch Radar belong to their respective owners. They are used only to identify the software each security fix applies to and to help readers find their platform. Their use does not imply any affiliation with, or endorsement by, those owners, and Patchblox is not affiliated with any of them.
