{
  "cveId": "CVE-2026-98166",
  "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-98166",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-98166 is fixed in linux on 1 platform by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98166 (version 7.2.8-1), released October 6, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: High.",
  "title": "linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving...",
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range  ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d (\u0022drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure\u0022) moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under \u0022if (!ret)\u0022, so the ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 (\u0022drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure\u0022) tests \u0022lret \u003E 0\u0022, which is what was intended here as well.  Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO\u0027s bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable. When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move (ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()), ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos-\u003Efirst / pos-\u003Elast is left pointing at freed memory. The next ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), \u0022list_del corruption\u0022 in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel Ainsworth\u0027s analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it dangles.  Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles were clean.",
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:17:58Z",
  "severity": "high",
  "cvss": 7.8,
  "cvssVector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
  "epss": 0.00157,
  "epssPercentile": 0.04884,
  "priority": "High",
  "priorityTier": 3,
  "exploited": false,
  "vendorExploited": false,
  "disclosed": false,
  "fixes": [
    {
      "platform": "linux",
      "product": "linux",
      "release": "Debian 14",
      "fixedVersion": "7.2.8-1",
      "fix": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98166",
      "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-98166",
      "released": "2026-10-06T21:56:27Z"
    }
  ],
  "noFixYet": [],
  "dataAsOf": "2026-11-08T00:53:09Z",
  "attribution": {
    "text": "Data: Patchblox Patch Radar",
    "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar",
    "terms": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar/use-the-data"
  }
}