# CVE-2026-93057: linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  scsi: ufs: core: Avoid possible memory reclaim d...

CVE-2026-93057 is fixed in linux on 1 platform by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-93057 (version 7.2.6-1), released September 23, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-93057
- Priority: Routine
- CVSS: n/a
- EPSS: 0.0020
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Sep 17, 2026

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  scsi: ufs: core: Avoid possible memory reclaim deadlock in TX EQTR context  TX EQTR may run while devfreq gear scaling has quiesced the UFS tagset. In that context, functions ufshcd_tx_eqtr(), __ufshcd_tx_eqtr() and ufs_qcom_get_rx_fom() allocate memory with GFP_KERNEL. If direct reclaim is triggered, reclaim/writeback can depend on I/O to UFS device. Because the queue is quiesced, this can cause deadlock.  Use memalloc_noio_save/restore() in ufshcd_tx_eqtr() to cover all allocations in the TX EQTR call tree, including:   - params->eqtr_record in ufshcd_tx_eqtr()   - eqtr_data in __ufshcd_tx_eqtr()   - params in ufs_qcom_get_rx_fom()  This is preferred over tagging individual call sites with GFP_NOIO, as it automatically covers any future allocations added anywhere in the call tree without requiring each caller to be aware of this constraint.  [mkp: fix label as suggested by Bart]

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | linux Debian 14 | 7.2.6-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-93057](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-93057.md) | Sep 23, 2026 |

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Data as of 2026-11-08T00:53:09Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

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