# CVE-2026-90264: btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races

CVE-2026-90264 is fixed in 20 products on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90264, released September 23, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-90264
- Priority: Routine
- CVSS: 5.5 (Moderate)
- EPSS: 0.0021
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Sep 17, 2026
- Vendor advisory: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-90264

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races  [BUG] Syzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same range:    BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[  179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists)   ------------[ cut here ]------------   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264!   Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026   RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0   Call Trace:    <TASK>    cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0    fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00    run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0    btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20    writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0    btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0    do_writepages+0x338/0x560    filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300    btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0    btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30    btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790    do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0    vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990    __se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0    do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f    </TASK>   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---  [CAUSE] Since commit ff66fe666233 ("btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback for append direct writes"), if the direct IO finished short, we will revert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be respected during the buffered fallback.  Normally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during buffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents.  But that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside the isize. Since we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not wait for any ordered extents.  This means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the tree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the buffered write, causing the above crash.  [FIX] Make the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize situation.  And since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the extents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles no-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the "_if_need" suffix.  The following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for btrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1m"` workload, all values are the average runtime in nano seconds.        function runtime              |   before    |     after  -----------------------------------+-------------+---------------  lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need()  |     58.2    |    183.0  btrfs_buffered_write()             |   2115.6    |   2973.3  The overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty tiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still acceptable.  An alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during iomap_end() where the isize revert is done.  But that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct IO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the next append buffered IO can still hit the same problem.  So here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least the code is slightly more streamline.

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | bpftool6.18 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | bpftool6.18-debuginfo amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel-livepatch-6.18.54-121.166 amzn 2023 | 1:1.0-0.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-debuginfo amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-debuginfo-common-aarch64 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-debuginfo-common-x86_64 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-devel amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-headers amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-modules-extra amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-modules-extra-common amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-tools amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-tools-debuginfo amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | kernel6.18-tools-devel amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | linux Debian 13.5 (trixie) | 6.12.115-2 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90264](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-90264.md) | Sep 23, 2026 |
| Linux | linux Debian 14 | 7.2.6-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90264](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-90264.md) | Sep 23, 2026 |
| Linux | microvm-kernel6.18 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | perf6.18 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | perf6.18-debuginfo amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | python3-perf6.18 amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | python3-perf6.18-debuginfo amzn 2023 | 1:6.18.54-121.166.amzn2023 | [ALAS2023-2026-3192](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/alas2023-2026-3192.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |

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Data as of 2026-11-08T06:59:42Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

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