{
  "cveId": "CVE-2026-90246",
  "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-90246",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-90246 is fixed in linux on 1 platform by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90246 (version 7.2.6-1), released September 23, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: High.",
  "title": "linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags()...",
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check  verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob. For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by that count stays inside sets.table[]:  \tu32 cnt = tags-\u003Esets.table[i];  \tif (i\u002Bcnt \u003E= tags-\u003Esets.size) {  i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i\u002Bcnt is evaluated modulo 2^32. sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob, and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it.  A count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[\u002B\u002Bi] past the end of the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation.  Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied count.  With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }:    i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 \u002B 0 \u003E= 2 is false, inner loop does not run   i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 \u002B 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 \u003E= 2 is          false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads          sets.table[2] -- one element past a two element allocation  The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be \u003E= hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an out-of-bounds read on the policy load path (aa_replace_profiles -\u003E aa_unpack -\u003E unpack_policydb -\u003E unpack_tags -\u003E verify_tags).  unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it.  Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject\u0027s own user namespace rather than the init user namespace, so with the default unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a globally privileged one.  Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the intended i \u002B cnt \u003C sets.size guarantee.",
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:20Z",
  "severity": "high",
  "cvss": 7.1,
  "cvssVector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
  "epss": 0.00166,
  "epssPercentile": 0.05868,
  "priority": "High",
  "priorityTier": 3,
  "exploited": false,
  "vendorExploited": false,
  "disclosed": false,
  "fixes": [
    {
      "platform": "linux",
      "product": "linux",
      "release": "Debian 14",
      "fixedVersion": "7.2.6-1",
      "fix": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90246",
      "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-90246",
      "released": "2026-09-23T19:19:02Z"
    }
  ],
  "noFixYet": [],
  "dataAsOf": "2026-11-08T06:59:42Z",
  "attribution": {
    "text": "Data: Patchblox Patch Radar",
    "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar",
    "terms": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar/use-the-data"
  }
}