# CVE-2026-71886: bouncycastle: In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or...

CVE-2026-71886 is fixed in bouncycastle on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-71886, released October 3, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71886
- Priority: Routine
- CVSS: n/a
- EPSS: 0.0017
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Oct 3, 2026

## Description

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | bouncycastle Debian 14 | 1.86-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-71886](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-71886.md) | Oct 3, 2026 |
| Linux | bouncycastle opensuse-leap 16.0 | 1.86-160000.1.1 | [OPENSUSE-SU-2026:22169-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/opensuse-su-2026-22169-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | bouncycastle sles 15.6 | 1.86-150200.3.41.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:4797-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-4797-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | bouncycastle sles 15.7 | 1.86-150200.3.41.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:4797-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-4797-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |
| Linux | bouncycastle sles 16.0 | 1.86-160000.1.1 | [SUSE-SU-2026:24461-1](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/suse-su-2026-24461-1.md) | Nov 7, 2026 |

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Data as of 2026-11-08T06:59:42Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

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