# CVE-2026-63799: linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  sched/mmcid: Fix OOB clear_bit when CID is MM_CI...

CVE-2026-63799 is fixed in linux on 1 platform by DEBIAN-CVE-2026-63799 (version 7.1.3-1), released July 20, 2026. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: High.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-63799
- Priority: High
- CVSS: 7.8 (high)
- EPSS: 0.0017
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: Jul 19, 2026

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  sched/mmcid: Fix OOB clear_bit when CID is MM_CID_UNSET in fixup path  In mm_cid_fixup_cpus_to_tasks(), when rq->curr has the target mm and mm_cid.active is set, the CID is checked with cid_in_transit() before setting the transition bit.  In per-CPU mode a newly forked or exec'd task can be running with mm_cid.cid == MM_CID_UNSET because CIDs are assigned lazily on schedule-in.  With cid_in_transit() the guard passes for MM_CID_UNSET (no transit bit), converts it to MM_CID_UNSET | MM_CID_TRANSIT and stores it back; later mm_cid_schedout() feeds this to clear_bit() with MM_CID_UNSET as the bit number, triggering an out-of-bounds write.  Symptoms: this is genuine memory corruption, but a bounded out-of-bounds write, not an arbitrary one.  MM_CID_UNSET is the fixed sentinel BIT(31), so once the bad value reaches mm_cid_schedout() the cid_from_transit_cid() strip leaves MM_CID_UNSET, which fails the "cid < max_cids" convergence test and falls into mm_drop_cid() -> clear_bit(MM_CID_UNSET, mm_cidmask(mm)).  The cid bitmap is embedded in the mm_struct slab object (after cpu_bitmap and mm_cpus_allowed) and is only num_possible_cpus() bits wide, so clearing bit 31 is a deterministic OOB bit-clear at a fixed offset of 2^31 / 8 == 256 MiB past the bitmap base.  The address is not attacker-influenced (fixed sentinel -> fixed offset) and the op only clears a single bit; what sits 256 MiB further along the direct map is whatever kernel object happens to live there, so this corrupts one bit of unpredictable kernel memory -- it is not an arbitrary-address or arbitrary-value write.  It triggers only in per-CPU CID mode, when a CPU is running an active task of the target mm whose cid is still MM_CID_UNSET -- the fork()/execve() window before that task's next schedule-in assigns it a real CID -- and a per-CPU -> per-task fixup walks over it (the mode fallback driven by a thread exit, sched_mm_cid_exit(), or by the deferred max_cids recompute in mm_cid_work_fn()).  In practice syzkaller surfaced it as a KASAN use-after-free reported in __schedule -> mm_cid_switch_to, where the offending clear_bit() is inlined via mm_cid_schedout() -> mm_drop_cid().  Guard the transition-bit assignment against MM_CID_UNSET, in addition to the existing cid_in_transit() check, so the bit is only set on a genuine task-owned CID.  A CPU-owned (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID of a running active task is handled by the cid_on_cpu(pcp->cid) branch above and never reaches this path, so excluding MM_CID_UNSET (and the already-transitioning case) is sufficient.

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | linux Debian 14 | 7.1.3-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2026-63799](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2026-63799.md) | Jul 20, 2026 |

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Data as of 2026-11-09T19:38:12Z UTC. Source: Patchblox Patch Radar (https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar). Patchblox finds out-of-date software on Windows, macOS and Linux and updates it through release rings: https://patchblox.com/demo

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