# CVE-2022-49783: linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  x86/fpu: Drop fpregs lock before inheriting FPU...

CVE-2022-49783 is fixed in linux on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2022-49783, released May 1, 2025. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: Routine.

- Web page: https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-49783
- Priority: Routine
- CVSS: 5.5 (medium)
- EPSS: 0.0017
- CISA KEV: not listed
- Exploited (vendor report): no
- Publicly disclosed: no
- Published: May 1, 2025

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  x86/fpu: Drop fpregs lock before inheriting FPU permissions  Mike Galbraith reported the following against an old fork of preempt-rt but the same issue also applies to the current preempt-rt tree.     BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46    in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: systemd    preempt_count: 1, expected: 0    RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0    Preemption disabled at:    fpu_clone    CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G            E       (unreleased)    Call Trace:     <TASK>     dump_stack_lvl     ? fpu_clone     __might_resched     rt_spin_lock     fpu_clone     ? copy_thread     ? copy_process     ? shmem_alloc_inode     ? kmem_cache_alloc     ? kernel_clone     ? __do_sys_clone     ? do_syscall_64     ? __x64_sys_rt_sigprocmask     ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode     ? do_syscall_64     ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode     ? do_syscall_64     ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode     ? do_syscall_64     ? exc_page_fault     ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe     </TASK>  Mike says:    The splat comes from fpu_inherit_perms() being called under fpregs_lock(),   and us reaching the spin_lock_irq() therein due to fpu_state_size_dynamic()   returning true despite static key __fpu_state_size_dynamic having never   been enabled.  Mike's assessment looks correct. fpregs_lock on a PREEMPT_RT kernel disables preemption so calling spin_lock_irq() in fpu_inherit_perms() is unsafe. This problem exists since commit    9e798e9aa14c ("x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features").  Even though the original bug report should not have enabled the paths at all, the bug still exists.  fpregs_lock is necessary when editing the FPU registers or a task's FP state but it is not necessary for fpu_inherit_perms(). The only write of any FP state in fpu_inherit_perms() is for the new child which is not running yet and cannot context switch or be borrowed by a kernel thread yet. Hence, fpregs_lock is not protecting anything in the new child until clone() completes and can be dropped earlier. The siglock still needs to be acquired by fpu_inherit_perms() as the read of the parent's permissions has to be serialised.    [ bp: Cleanup splat. ]

## Where it's fixed

| Platform | Product | Fixed in | Fix | Released |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | linux Debian 12.15 (bookworm) | 6.0.10-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2022-49783](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-49783.md) | May 1, 2025 |
| Linux | linux Debian 13.5 (trixie) | 6.0.10-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2022-49783](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-49783.md) | May 1, 2025 |
| Linux | linux Debian 14 | 6.0.10-1 | [DEBIAN-CVE-2022-49783](https://patchblox.com/security/data/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-49783.md) | May 1, 2025 |

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