{
  "cveId": "CVE-2022-48733",
  "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-48733",
  "summary": "CVE-2022-48733 is fixed in linux on 1 platform, first by DEBIAN-CVE-2022-48733, released June 20, 2024. It is not reported as exploited. Patch Radar priority: High.",
  "title": "linux: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to creat...",
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot  At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and then attach it to the transaction\u0027s list of pending snapshots. After that we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump to \u0027fail\u0027 label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot:  1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction\u0027s    list of pending snapshots;  2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first    call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups().    In both cases, we don\u0027t abort the transaction and we release our    transaction handle. We jump to the \u0027fail\u0027 label and free the pending    snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the    transaction\u0027s list;  3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there\u0027s no error at    all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer    to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task    has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free.  This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the following warning:    fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: \u0027\u0026pending_snapshot-\u003Elist\u0027 not removed from list  So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the pending snapshot to the transaction\u0027s list. Instead add the pending snapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction() we add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error returned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which case the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can access it anymore.",
  "published": "2024-06-20T12:15:11Z",
  "severity": "high",
  "cvss": 7.8,
  "cvssVector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
  "epss": 0.0023,
  "epssPercentile": 0.13901,
  "priority": "High",
  "priorityTier": 3,
  "exploited": false,
  "vendorExploited": false,
  "disclosed": false,
  "fixes": [
    {
      "platform": "linux",
      "product": "linux",
      "release": "Debian 12.15 (bookworm)",
      "fixedVersion": "5.16.10-1",
      "fix": "DEBIAN-CVE-2022-48733",
      "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-48733",
      "released": "2024-06-20T12:15:11Z"
    },
    {
      "platform": "linux",
      "product": "linux",
      "release": "Debian 13.5 (trixie)",
      "fixedVersion": "5.16.10-1",
      "fix": "DEBIAN-CVE-2022-48733",
      "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-48733",
      "released": "2024-06-20T12:15:11Z"
    },
    {
      "platform": "linux",
      "product": "linux",
      "release": "Debian 14",
      "fixedVersion": "5.16.10-1",
      "fix": "DEBIAN-CVE-2022-48733",
      "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/fix/linux/debian-cve-2022-48733",
      "released": "2024-06-20T12:15:11Z"
    }
  ],
  "noFixYet": [],
  "dataAsOf": "2026-11-08T00:53:09Z",
  "attribution": {
    "text": "Data: Patchblox Patch Radar",
    "url": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar",
    "terms": "https://patchblox.com/security/patch-radar/use-the-data"
  }
}